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Introduction 
Studies in religion as a profession has a key role to play in the management of 
religious diversity in liberal democratic societies. In particular, it can help mediate 
between the sometimes competing demands of religious conviction and public life. 
A society willing to grant individuals a large degree of autonomy over their moral 
and religious practice, ought not to be a society in which "anything" goes; nor ought 
it to be a society in which religion is at best privatised, or at worst trivialised. A 
society which forgoes the imposition of one religious outlook or established religion, 
does not therefore leave the field off-limits to discussion; though this is often a 
popular misunderstanding of liberal toleration. As that great proponent of liberalism, 
John Stuart Mill (1859, rpt, 1991:84) himself pointed out, what we must not legislate, 
we must nevertheless endeavour through conviction and persuasion to educate and 
cultivate. "It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine [of liberty] to suppose 
that it is one of selfish indifference". Yet a soggy kind of popular liberalism, does 
seem to use the idea of tolerance as a dampener on all forms of conviction and 
enthusiasm. From my experience teaching in schools as diverse as humanities, 
nursing, justice studies and optometry, the issue of religion persistently arises in the 
discussion of values, culture and professional practice. Whether it is a Muslim student 
sitting in a class of twenty-eight optometry students discussing professional ethics, 
nurses wanting to know how to handle the body of Jewish or a Hindu patient, police 
officers discussing the administration of justice in a multicultural society, or 
humanities students assessing the confidentiality of the confessional, or the religious 
influence on current political debates, it is clear that religion continues to play its 
part in public life. In most cases, these students will not have the time, nor the 
opportunity, to become experts in the study of religion; yet they will need to draw on 
sound knowledge in the field to gain insights into the dimension of religion in their 
workplace. 
To achieve this, there has to be group of scholars who commit themselves to 
the study of religion, who set aside the time and take up the available opportunities 
to gain knowledge of religions. Students and practitioners in these other fields, and 
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indeed the general public, need to be able to trust this group of scholars to provide 
them with sound knowledge. The relationship between scholars of religion and 
these end-users of religious knowledge is fundamentally unequal and such an 
imbalance in knowledge and power is typical of all forms professional expertise. For 
this reason, the practice of studies in religion needs to be grounded in the same 
ethical frameworks which normatively circumscribe professional behaviours. The 
more so because in the past decade, university life, like many areas of public life, is 
being reconfigured in business-like ways. The agenda of universities in Australia 
has changed from one of public service to one of corporate or private enterprise. 
Universities are being seen as businesses, as large corporations. The public role of 
intellectuals within this changing agenda cannot be adequately addressed through 
adopting a contractual or user-pay approaches. As we move from public to corporate 
to private, we need to remember that business is not the only model for delivering 
services in the private sphere. Professionalism, rightly understood, is an alternative. 
If we are to understand how this alternative will apply to the study of religion we 
will need to re-examine the characteristics of a profession and how a profession 
differs from other forms of occupation. 
The characteristics of a profession 
An important distinction needs to be made between descriptive and normative 
understandings of professions. The publicly stated aims of a profession may often be 
at odds with what actually happens. Descriptive approaches tell us how professions 
are organised and what they achieve. There have been many such sociological 
evaluations of professions, including Ivan Illich's (1977) provocatively, but accurately 
named, Disabling Professions (See also, Andrews (1992) from a social work 
perspective and M. Coady (1996) for a largely descriptive philosophical point of 
view). As Anthony Giddens (1993) points out, professionals might be described 
sociologically as, on the one hand, "occupants of jobs requiring high-level educational 
qualifications, whose behaviour is subject to codes of conduct laid down by central 
bodies (or professional associations); or, on the other hand, they could also justly be 
described as "a monopoly practice with material and symbolic benefits, often based 
on social closure rather than social service". Whether or not professions are currently 
living up to their ideals is an serious practical question, but from a normative ethical 
point of view what is important is the vision of what a profession ought to be and 
how a professional ought to act. William May ( 1989) has argued that the question of 
professional identity can be fruitfully explored by comparing professions with 
vocations and careers. He noted the theological heritage of the terms such as vocation 
and profession. Vocation implies a calling, a life-long commitment to a public role 
that is not exhausted by the "bourgeois notion of a job". A vocation encompassed 
more than work life, could be pursued without remuneration and included as well 
the roles of husband, wife and citizen. The term career differs from vocation and 
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profession in not necessarily implying public concerns. If we call someone a careerist, 
we are usually not paying them a compliment. Careerists do take on public roles but 
they pursue that public role for private ends. "The careerist travels by public 
thoroughfares and largely obeys the rules of the road, but towards his or her private 
destination" (May 1989:3). 
The term profession, however, has the same public ring to it as vocation. To 
profess is to 'testify on behalf of' or 'stand for' something. Profession, then, implies 
commitment. According to Daryl Koehn (1994: 56), it is the public nature of this 
commitment that distinguishes a profession from other occupations and grounds its 
moral legitimacy. Five traits, she writes, are frequently cited as pertaining to a 
profession. Professionals: 
- are licensed by the state to perform a certain act 
- belong to an organisation of similarly enfranchised agents who promulgate 
standards and/or ideals of behaviour and who discipline one another for 
breaking the standards 
-possess so-called esoteric knowledge or skills not shared by other members 
of the community 
- exercise autonomy over their work 
- publicly pledge themselves to render assistance to those in need and as a 
consequence have special responsibilities or duties not incumbent upon others 
who have not made this pledge. 
For Koehn the first four traits are neither necessary nor sufficient to define a 
professional. The fifth trait, however, represents the "atypical moral commitment of 
the professional" (Koehn, 1994:56). People becomes clients of professionals because 
they seek a good which they lack the expertise to acquire for themselves. Professionals 
pledge themselves to provide these goods to their clients. The goods to which 
professionals devote their learning and skill are genuine human goods which are 
ends in themselves; for example, health (doctors), justice (lawyers) or salvation 
(clergy). Koehn's insight is to relate this public pledge to serve a particular good to 
issues which frame professional responsibility such as: the untrustworthiness of 
expertise, the insufficiency of client contract, the limits of professional discretion, 
the good of the professional and the professional and the public good. To explore the 
professional aspects of our scholarly practice, however, it will be more useful to use 
William May's more summary organisation of professional traits into three 
components - the intellectual, the collegial and the moral. 
The intellectual component 
Professional knowledge, May argues, is knowledge based on access to first 
principles. This differs from the forms of knowledge required to undertake other 
occupations. It is different from the kind of handbook or training manual knowledge 
necessary to accomplish a clearly defined task; for example, fixing a particular model 
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of washing machine. It is also different from the body of knowledge and skills passed 
on by tradition from one generation to another. Mastery of specific competencies 
and appropriation of the benefits of past knowledge is certainly required of 
professionals, but it never stops there. Access to first principles enables the 
professional practitioner to adopt a critical approach to problems, not only those 
which are routinely expected, but also new problems as they arise. 
Historically, the distinction between education and training led to the transfer 
of professional education to universities and away from the apprenticeship model of 
the older proprietary organisations. (May, 1989: 7) Training smacked of socialisation 
into a set of practices; on the other hand, education in a university setting is the 
cultivation of an independent and critical intelligence. For our purposes, this 
distinction is inflected in a particular way when the distinction is made between the 
disciplines of history of religion (Religionswissenschaft) and theology. The former 
is characterised, along with other disciplines such as anthropology, psychology and 
sociology, as an objective approach to the study of religion (Streng, 1985:190). 
Theology, whatever its critical vitality in the hands of its more able exponents, is 
viewed as confessional in its presuppositions, origin and environment (Cahill, 1982). 
To drive too great a wedge between these approaches seems fruitless, if not 
dangerous; particularly if it leads us to solve the problem of the intellectual constraints 
of working within a particular confessional framework, by doing away with any 
concern for commitment and values in the pursuit of a so-called value-free objectivity. 
The problem is not with commitment and values per se. None is·so political as those 
who loudly claim not to be political, and none is expressing value so strongly as 
those who claim to be value-free. As a human science, the·study of religion always 
involves value judgments in deciding what is to be the object of study, of defining 
what is and is not a religion, and what aspects of religious life should be the object 
of inquiry. Also, as Cahill pointed out over a decade ago, religious studies benefited 
over theology in being more politically acceptable to the ethos of the secular university. 
Since then, things have changed, and many institutions have recognised the dollar 
value of collaborative arrangements between theological colleges and university 
faculties. So in recent years, a degree in theology is more likely to be added to 
university offerings than courses in studies in religion. It is, perhaps, not the first 
time that a surplus value has been extracted from belief. In considering the intellectual 
component of studies of religion as a profession, the question is not whether religion 
and religions constitute a domain of knowledge, but rather what would constitute 
expert knowledge. It could be argued that religious practitioners are themselves 
experts on their own religious beliefs and practices. But this view will not stand up 
to any sustained scrutiny. Robert Redfield (1960) long ago coined the terms 'great 
tradition' and 'little tradition' to distinguish official and folk or popular forms of 
religious beliefs and practice within the one religious movement. Religious knowledge 
and expertise is not evenly spread throughout the membership of a religion; some 
within the tradition develop religious expertise and in some cases are· the keepers 
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esoteric forms of knowledge. Do these religious experts serve a public good? Are 
they professionals? Well we can certainly grant them the status that has traditionally 
been granted the clergy in the West. Clergy possess knowledge about values and 
beliefs, and more particularly about salvation - the manifest functional goal of all 
religions, according to Bryan Wilson (1982) - which is the good which clients, in 
this case believers, would utilise if they could. 
Clearly, the expertise of scholars of religion differs from that of the clergy or 
expert practitioner. They are not competent to offer authoritative advice on spiritual 
salvation within a particular tradition, at least not in their academic role; rather, the 
core undertaking of the scholar ofreligion should be to help those who are not in the 
tradition to gain lmbwleuge about the religion. Scholars of religion develop expertise 
in various modes of inquiry that can help foster understanding of religious belief 
and practice in its varied forms. Now, the expertise of many scholars who are interested 
in religion is confined to a particular discipline; for example, psychology, sociology, 
anthropology or history. Or perhaps, they have specialised in a particular language. 
They will be able to provide knowledge on particular religions or texts to their 
clients; that is those who pay for, or have a demand for, their services. Yet, there has 
also been a significant tradition in the study of religion that would argue that the 
scholar of religion is not simply the practitioner of a discipline who happens to pick 
religion as his or her subject matter. The tradition flowing from Rudolf Otto (1958), 
Gerhardus van derLeeuw (1983), andMirceaEliade (1959), sees the study of religion 
as offering a unique or sui generis approach to its subject matter. It may be typified 
as anti-reductive and phenomenological in approach, attempting an appreciation of 
the beliefs, values and practices of a religion as it is intended by its practitioners. 
Ninian Smart (1983) describes the methodical approach of this tradition as one of 
'structured empathy'. The knowledge such a scholar seeks is not simply knowledge 
about the psychology, sociology or history of a particular religion but its irreducibly 
religious dimension as well. 
What a scholar of religion, working within this tradition, can offer, then, is a 
sympathetic and structured knowledge of religious beliefs and practices. Central to 
the audacity of the classic practitioners (e.g. Otto, 1958; rpt 1923; van der Leeuw, 
1983, rpt 1938; Eliade, 1959), so often derided in later times, is a commitment to a 
structural and comparative approach. To be sure, these scholars read the underlying 
structure of religion from a European point of view, and their structuralism was 
essentialist and prone to discount the distinctiveness of particular traditions, often 
paradoxically drawing on a European reading of an Eastern syncretism to do so; 
Yet, I believe, the motto of comparative religion remains true, 'Who knows one, 
knows none'. 
While it has been fashionable at various times to insist that there is no such 
thing as religion, only religions, and no such thing as Christianity, for example, but 
only Christianities, we ought to proceed again, enlightened and chastened by the 
wrong turns of the past. Structuralist and post-structuralist modes of thought, 
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grounded in the linguistic distinction between language and utterance, offered new 
horizons for comparativism. Even more so the postmodern condition presents us not 
only with individuals moving between traditions and indeed inventing new ones, 
but religions themselves are more than ever in contact and conflict. Comparison, in 
all its political and embodied forms (including violence) is a fact of religious life; to 
not recognise this and deal with it constructively at the scholarly level would be a 
serious omission. Some form of comparativism, then, remains a core feature of the 
professionalism of the scholar of religion. It is demanded of the scholar of religion, 
even though it is not demanded of the theologian, nor the scholar who is primarily a 
psychologist, sociologist or historian. 
Knowledge of religions provided by professional scholars of religion should 
endeavour to be structured, comparative, and empathetic, and to be truly professional. 
That knowledge should also be critical, not just technical or descriptive. Universities 
in modern times has become increasingly technicist, even in the humanities. Even 
more so, the work of universities has come to be seen in terms of market forces. 
Seventeenth and eighteenth century notions that the world of nature had its own 
laws, and that science and technologies were value free, and that economies worked 
by universal laws not values, have had some confused resurgence in the public debate. 
Yet, the critical demands of professional knowledge should always lead it towards 
the domain of evaluation and judgment. Critically independent thought ought not to 
imply idiosyncrasy and lack of public concern; rather, it should be the foundation 
for a critical and transformative engagement with the wider society. As Majella 
Franzmann (1997) pointed out last year some scholars of religion find it hard to 
accept that the public expects them to be able to give an informed and critical 
evaluation of religious beliefs and practices, past and present. Insight that does not, 
or is not willing to, inform judgment, is not insight at all. 
A better way of understanding the relationship between the academic study of 
religion and the need to form judgments about specific manifestations of religion is 
to understand that, in some way, the professional study of religion, is not undertaken 
for the scholar's sake, but always on behalf of someone else. After all, professional 
scholars of religion are not self-funding; they are paid to research and teach in their 
discipline. While this might seem, at first glance, to be uncomfortably commercial, 
we should recall that in the context of professionalism the client is never merely a 
consumer. Professionals usually act on their client's instructions. They are to help 
provide a good which the client lacks, but they do not have to do everything the 
client wants them to. Their responsiveness to client demands is limited by the nature 
of the good which the client is seeking. Doctors do not have to give patients the 
medication they ask for, if they do not think it will be in the interest of their health. 
Lawyers do not have to follow their client's instruction no matter what; they are 
limited by their concern to help their client seek justice, not just a win in court. 
Scholarly professionals ought to be committed to helping their clients seek the 
truth. We have this in common with other academics. But there still remains the 
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question of whether the scholar of religion also has a role to play in helping others to 
achieve a particular kind of self-understanding. Mircea Eliade (1969), for example, 
argued that the scholars of religion were, in their own way, engaged in the same 
processes of identifying and seeking answers to the fundamental questions of human 
existence which motivated religious practitioners. While we must bracket out our 
assumptions when investigating a particular manifestation of religion, the very process 
of inquiry itself is a kind of religious 'quest', a concern for what is ultimately important 
to human existence. 
Before leaving the intellectual component, we need to observe that expertise 
in itself is not a ground for clients to tmst a professional. The fact that someone has 
a skill, does not necessarily in itself ensure that the person with that skill will use it 
for the benefit of others. That skill may be used to harm as well as help. There 
always has to be a further commitment on the part of the professional to use their 
skills only to benefit others. In the same way, the esoteric nature of the knowledge 
does not indicate professionalism. Koehn (1994:57) suggests that "if knowledge 
and autonomy over work were sufficient from professionalism, then a coven of witches 
would qualify as professionals". We might argue about the appropriateness of the 
metaphor, but Koehn does raise the interesting question of the status of full-time 
researchers. Presumably, for Koehn, academics count as professionals because they 
also teach, directly imparting knowledge to clients, helping them obtain a good. The 
quest for knowledge for its own sake is not out of the question, but surely there 
should be at least a minimal clientele for one's work. 
The organisational component 
The second component of a profession is the organisational. It is often said 
that professionals belong to national or international bodies which set standards for 
practice. Joining together in such bodies is important in moving people beyond a 
level of voluntary activity. Someone starts a new practice to meet an unmet need and 
in the early days there is much experimentation and excitement. Eventually, an 
organisation is formed, standards set, and then finally those who will not join are 
excluded. (Andrews, 1992) Ultimately, then, is a professional association more a 
promulgator of standards or a gatekeeper? 
When I started my undergraduate university career in the early 70s, there 
were very few opportunities to pursue the study of religion in Australia. One of my 
primary degrees is a Bachelor of Divinity. The Australian Association for the Study 
of Religions came into being to draw together the many new initiatives in the academic 
study of religion that emerged in the mid-1970s. Also, in the area in which I teach 
and research now, there are very few graduates in applied ethics. Our school sought 
out people with PhDs in cognate fields, but now we have our own graduates emerging 
in the field and there have recently been some national associations formed such as 
the Australian Association for Professional and Applied Ethics and the Australian 
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Bioethics Association. 
Merely belonging to an organisation is neither necessary not sufficient for 
professionalism. As Koehn (1994: 57) points out,"If it were sufficient, Ku Klux 
Klan members would all be professionals". Nevertheless, according to May, there is 
a normative vision which should shape professional organisations. When professionals 
associate with each other it ought to be on a collegial rather than· competitive basis. 
We see this in the traditional academic concern that the fruits of knowledge are to be 
more-or-less freely shared. Though many academics do make money out of publishing, 
the primary focus is on the free dissemination of know ledge. This leads to some 
interesting paradoxes in the current economic rationalist climate, where universities 
and individual academics now give more concern to protecting and promoting their 
intellectual property. The royalties earned from books were once seen as merely 
additional income for academics. Universities now demand a greater share of the 
income from products produced with their resources. How might this affect the 
collegial nature of information sharing in the academic world? Will it restrict the 
free flow of knowledge? 
May also argues that, in principle, professional organisations should be peer-
based rather than hierarchical. We can see this operating in academic conferences 
where, ideally, presentations are considered on their own merits. Whether the 
presenter is a postgraduate researcher, as junior staff member or a professor, they are 
respectfully listened to and debated. It is interesting here that the AASR differs from 
some similar associations overseas in not excluding non-academics from membership. 
The moral component 
It is probably clear by now that both Koehn and May place a heavy burden on 
the moral component of professionalism in defining.the professional's role. Indeed, 
the atypical moral commitment of the professional is founded upon the nature of the 
professional-client relationship itself. 
Koehn (1994:59) reminds us that the Oxford English Dictionary takes 
professionals and clients to be correlatives, defining a client as 'someone who receives 
professional services'. The professional-client relationship is not a philanthropic 
relationship, in which the giver has all the power to set the agenda. Nor is it a fiscal 
or contractual relationship, in which two parties enter into agreement (explicit or 
implicit) for an exchange of goods or services. A contract spells out what each party 
is entitled to; you get what you are pay for.· Each party, in theory, has equal power. 
May (1989: 6) argues that "the professional exchange should differ morally from a 
market-place transaction in two important ways. First, a market-place transaction 
assumes an encounter between two self-interested and relatively knowledgable 
parties". Wariness marks the exchange and it is assumed that each party will act out 
of self-interest. "Let the buyer beware". But in a professional exchange we cannot 
assume two relatively knowledgable parties. "An asymmetry exists between the 
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professional and the client, disproportionate knowledge on one side and ignorance 
on the other". The client is relatively powerless in this situation. A professional 
relationship, is covenantal in nature, it is an unequal relationship based on trust; in 
particular, the client puts her trust in the professional to always act in her best 
interests. The only counterbalance to this position of vulnerability is the professional's 
public pledge to further the client's interests. 
In academic life, there are many opportunities to experiment with equality in 
the classroom, to engage in collaborative learning, to rearrange the furniture in 
one's office to break down hierarchical barriers or to spend a lot of time socialising 
with one's students; nevertheless ultimately, if we have any reason for claiming a 
specific expertise, there will always remain a fundamental inequality between teachers 
and students. In this power relationship, students are vulnerable. They start a course 
knowing very little about it and trusting that the teacher will impart sound and up-
to-date knowledge to them. It is sobering to think that you could make it all up and 
they would not know! 
Why do clients put themselves in such a vulnerable position? Because the 
professional can help them obtain a good end which they themselves would have 
pursued if they had the necessary knowledge. If we could meet our own health needs 
or justice needs we would not need recourse to doctors or lawyers. And if our clients 
had access to the resources and skills we have, they would not need us. 
Some implications may be that we are obliged to some degree to itch where 
people are scratching. The curriculum should be context driven, not just teaching 
subjects because we can teach them. This does not necessarily mean merely giving 
the punters what they want, but it does mean working with them to develop relevant 
and interesting offerings. 
If professionals pledge themselves to pursue a public good on behalf of their 
clients, then what is the public good to which scholars of religion commit themselves? 
Surely that good end is the pursuit of truth. Our task is not to know everything, but 
rather to be guardians of tools, the means, by which the truth can be found. Scholars 
of religion who research in living communities also carry added responsibilities to 
act professionally arid recognise the vulnerability of the individuals and communities 
which they study; for example, they should not abuse the trust put in them by their 
hosts, by not revealing that they are undertaking research; certainly, they should not 
distort the truth. 
But is there something more required of scholars of religions than these general 
academic demands?· Is there also a responsibility on our part to ensure that students 
grapple with ultimate questions, if not develop an appreciation of the transcendent? 
Should we not go further and cultivate a commitment to making a difference in the 
world? 
In a university, the pursuit of such goals is always within the context of the 
cultivation of critical intelligence. For me, the study in religion is essentially a form 
of religious criticism, of writing on (and over) religion. Such an approach is demanded 
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by the phenomenon of religion itself. Vander Leeuw (1983:206) rightly observed, 
"For apart from some kind of criticism of life no religion whatever is conceivable". 
As a form of critical intelligence, the study of religion should not only describe and 
explain the religious situation, but also offer critical judgment, assessing whether 
particular religious beliefs and practices further human domination or emancipation. 
Also, scholars of religion need to grasp not only the history of religion, but also the 
future of religion. We must be able to understand religions of the past, the present 
and forms of religion yet to be conceived. A structural, comparative and empathetic 
outlook can make this possible. 
Scholars of religion have a professional responsibility to nurture the civic self; 
that is, to cultivate an awareness of individual responsibilities in a communal context. 
We are publicly accountable for our work, for the decisions and values which inform 
it. The religions we study also have this dimension of social and moral responsibility. 
It is not our role to make people dependent on us for knowledge and to confine our 
intellectual pursuits to the university. We should endeavour to be public intellectuals. 
In the early days of religious studies in Australia reference was often made to 
the 'religious illiteracy' instilled by our predominantly secular forms of education. 
Teaching and researching on religions allows us opportunities to educate and inform 
others. The more informed individuals are about religion and religions the more 
they can make informed choices about religion and the less likely to be wrongfully 
deceived. Thus, scholars of religion can make a vital contribution to building what 
has been called 'social capital', the trust which acts as a kind of glue holding us 
together in the pursuits of common goals. According to Eva Cox (1995), social 
capital is built up working together, voluntarily in egalitarian organisations. She 
tends to underplay the role of religious organisations in her assessment. Perhaps 
they are not egalitarian enough. But egalitarian organisations are not born overnight 
and enormous amounts of public goodwill and social cohesion has been built up by 
religious groups (and suspicion as well, no doubt). Either way, it seems to me to be 
very important to recognise the vital role that scholars of religion can play in building 
up understanding about and between religious traditions. 
Just as the department in which I was trained, stipulated that honours students 
and postgraduates must study a religious traditions other than the one in which they 
had a major interest, so too would we all benefit be devoting some of our teaching 
and research time to transformative engagement with the contemporary religious 
situation. To do this, scholars of religion need to acknowledge their professional 
responsibilities and orient altruistically to meet client needs. The only alternative, 
in the current climate, is the barbarism of a business-like agenda in which knowledge 
of transcendence and ultimate concerns are bartered like trinkets in a gift shop. As 
always, we stand on the threshold between the sacred and the profane. 
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